From The Old Testament World by John Rogerson and Philip Davies:

To illustrate what Job is up against, God invokes his creative power. This, as we have seen in Proverbs, is an argument especially dear to Wisdom literature, for the maker of the universe is the source of all ethics too. But here the order in creation is definitely not the argument—rather the opposite! God does not present himself as a grand designer of a magnificent, orderly system. Instead he speaks of himself as one who created monstrous animals like the crocodile and the hippopotamus (Leviathan and Behemoth). Let a person understand these creatures, mightier than human beings! For if one cannot understand even these, how can one understand God? Job has been challenging a God of order and of justice. God responds as one whose ways do not make sense—at least to humans. One cannot ‘draw out’ a crocodile, and one cannot ‘draw out’ God in debate, either. One can only fear these terrible beasts, and fear God, who conceived and made them.

So Job accepts, and the poem undermines any complacency that wisdom might induce, any security in the ultimate reasonableness of life, or of God. The poem affirms God as a free agent, answerable to no-one, nor to any principle such as justice. But in the opening narrative we are told that Job’s suffering does have a rational basis, and God’s behaviour does make sense. Job, of course, knows nothing of this, and God does not speak of them, even in the closing narrative. So the reader of the book knows more than Job does, and more than God admits to Job. For God has been challenged by the Satan to a test (1:8-12; 2:3-6), a wager, and he has accepted. Job’s sufferings will determine whether righteousness really exists. In the story the test is a test not of Job but of God. And Job, not God, is the free agent.

Thomas J Oord proposes an alternative theory of creation:

My theory says God never creates out of absolute nothingness. Each moment of creation history begins with God creating something in relation to what God previously created. God always creates something new from something old and never ex nihilo.

This theory says God has always been creating. God’s work to create in relation to what God previously created has always been going on. To put it another way, God’s creating is everlasting. That’s why I call God the “ever Creator.” God’s creating activity had no absolute beginning and is new every moment of a history without beginning or end.

The entire article is good and worth a read. There seems to be issues with rendering some text (e.g. ‘ is rendered as â€), which need to be ignored, but the writing is solid. Some excerpts:

Framing the Debate

It is no secret that Open Theists read scriptures with different operative principles of interpretation than those who maintain classical theology. Open theists generally argue that scriptural passages demonstrate that God changes his mind, relents, repents or feels sorrow for things that have occurred. If they are correct, then at least to the extent such scripture is regarded as disclosing what is true of God, then God cannot be, as classical theists maintain: (1) immutable in the strong sense that none of God’s intrinsic properties is subject to change; (2) impassible in the sense that nothing outside of God influences him or otherwise has no feelings comparable to human feelings; (3) timeless in the sense that God is outside of any type of temporal succession; (4) prescient in the sense that God has infallible foreknowledge.

Those who oppose Open Theism argue that the “literal” readings of scripture by Open Theists ignore more general statements about God elsewhere in the Bible; fail to recognize that God adapts himself “anthropomorphically” to speak to mere mortals and that from the divine point of view things look very different than from this view adapted to human weaknesses. We question whether this type of critique of open theists can be coherently maintained. Indeed, it seems that those who critique open theists readings makes several hermeneutical assumptions that are not merely foreign to the text itself, but which assume a view of human knowledge that is both arrogant and impossible from the human stance.

Exegesis of Exodus 32

There are several key points to be made about this text. God clearly declares that he intends to destroy the Israelites who had made the golden calf and to fulfill his promises by raising up a holy people through the lineage of Moses’ descendants alone. Moses, however, contends with God. Moses “begged” God to both “turn” (bwX) his wrath and “repent” (mhn) of his purpose to destroy Israel. (v. 12) The verbs here show that Moses expected God to change what he had declared he would do. He expected God to change his mind. The Hebrew verb nacham means not merely to change, but its primary meaning is to feel sorrow or regret for what one does. Its primary meaning is emotive. It refers to the emotional tone of one’s feelings about one’s own actions. The Hebrew shuv means to turn around, to turn from, to change one’s course or direction. Moses then asks God to remember (rkz) the covenant he has made to raise seed from them as numerous as the stars. God then “repents” (KJV) or “relents” (NAB) or “changes his mind about the disaster he had planned to bring to his people.” (NRSV). While Moses believes that God’s intentions and declarations can be turned away and changed, he believes that there is something that must remain constant: God’s commitment to his covenant promises. Thus, Moses argues with God based upon the unchanging commitment to his covenant with Abraham to make of him a great nation. What is unchanging for Moses in this narrative is not God; but God’s purposes and promises.

On Reading the Bible

The most obvious problem with such a view is that there is no principled basis for distinguishing non-literal or metaphoric readings from those that should be taken as literal. All language is “anthropomorphic” in the sense that it is the tool we use to express, refer and communicate. So all and any language is to some extent “anthropomorphic” or irredeemably limited by our own epistemic horizons and linguistic usages and practices. We cannot escape our own skin. Yet limiting the scripture by denying any conclusion that could be drawn that is not expressed in the very quoting of scripture itself without any grasp of what is asserted makes reading scripture rather pointless. We can read the words, but not grasp or understand in any way what is being said by those words. Thus, all language is metaphoric since the sign is not what is pointed to by the sign or words used. To that extent, this objection is over-broad. Moreover, it would rule out the possibility not only of the deductive conclusions of open theists but also certainly the classical view which is, if anything, even more far removed from the scriptural language.

Moreover, there is no rule or set of criteria provided in the scripture itself to discern whether something should be taken literally or merely metaphorically. When the scripture straightforwardly asserts that Moses saw God and spoke with him face to face, or that God has the form of the appearance of a human as Ezekiel asserted, the traditional views have uniformly asserted that a prior commitment to God’s immaterial nature rules out taking such statements as descriptions of what God is really like. Mormons take these passages literally as statements revealing God’s likeness and image. When the scriptures rather straightforwardly state that God changed his mind, repented or relented, how do we decide that these are not actually statements describing what God actually did instead of some metaphor to human experience to allow us to grasp some bare notion of what God actually did? We suggest that arguments that such passages should be taken metaphorically and not as assertions stating what God actually did are driven by prior theological commitments and not the text. In fact, there is nothing in these texts suggesting merely a metaphorical reading. The explanation that the language is merely metaphorical is thus a conclusion not based on the text from outside the text based on prior commitments that conflict with the text. Yet how could our views of God ever be informed by the text if we read the text in this manner? Such a way of approaching the text is presumptuous because it assumes that we already know more than the text and can correct the text based upon extra-textual theological commitment or linguistic practices.

On Jonah and Exodus 32

Piper applies this reasoning to the text in Jonah and suggests that God’s unconditional declaration that Ninevah would be overthrown was in reality based on a condition of repentance “that if the Ninevites meet, they will be spared.” So Jonah 3:4 should be read with the implicit condition, which if made explicit would say: “Yet forty days and Ninevah will be overthrown unless you repent.” The people of Ninevah repented, so God was not mistaken and the prophecy by Jonah was accurate because, Piper claims, all such prophecies of threat of destruction must be understood to contain such a conditional clause as suggested by Jeremiah 18:7-10. Yet it seems fairly clear that there is in reality no change in God’s intentions as Piper claims. All along God knew that Ninevah would repent and all along he intended that Jonah’s prophecy would be the catalyst to bring about that repentance. God intended to relent when Ninevah repented all along. However, it also follows that what Jonah declared was neither true nor an accurate reflection of God’s intention. Ninevah was not overthrown in forty days, as Jonah declared it would be. Nor did God ever intend that it would be; rather, he intended and knew that Ninevah would repent and that Ninevah would not be destroyed.

Piper’s strategy doesn’t do justice to the text. There is no such conditional stated in the text of Jonah 3:4. What Jonah asserted did not come to pass. However, barring arguments of the uselessness of simple foreknowledge or the circularity arguments against middle knowledge, given the text alone as a guide it is at least possible that God intended the people to repent and knew that his threat through Jonah would bring it about. Perhaps the Israelites had such an implicit understanding as suggested by Jeremiah. The absolute prophecy of destruction of Ninevah may then be read as a conditional because all prophecies are conditional. Even if God knows the future, it may be the case that God knows of the repentance which his prophecy brings about.

However, this strategy fails miserably in the context of Exodus 32. If we alter Exodus 32:10 along the lines suggested by Piper, it reads as follows with implicit assertions made explicit: “Now therefore leave me alone, that my wrath may burn hot against them, and that I may consume them; and I will make of you a great nation unless they repent — and I know that they won’t repent.” There is a problem with Piper’s suggested strategy, however. The Israelites did not repent and if God knew the future, then God knew they wouldn’t repent. However, God changes his intentions anyway. So God’s change of intentions cannot be explained by Israel’s repentance. God’s change of intentions was not occasioned by the repentance of Israel, but by Moses’s steadfast stand for his people and willingness to ask God to relent what he had declared. So the actual change is not about repentance but about Moses’s argument. So Exodus 32:10 must be changed as follows: “Now therefore leave me alone [even though I know that you will not leave me alone but argue against what I am now suggesting], that my wrath may burn hot against them, and that I may consume them; and I will make of you a great nation unless you argue with me to not do so – as you are now doing and I know that I will not do what I am now saying I will.” The problem with amending Exodus 32 along the lines suggested by Piper is that it results in not merely non-sense, but in God flatly contradicting what he declares his intentions to be. It also results in the dialogue becoming disgenuine and contrived.

In Numbers 14, Yahweh is completely provoked by Israel, who endlessly complains about its treatment by Yahweh. Yahweh’s patience with Israel is exhausted. In weariness, Yahweh confides in Moses that Yahweh would like simply to destroy Israel and to start over with only Moses (v. 12). Moses seeks to talk Yahweh out of this declared destructive intention. Moses employs two strategies in seeking to persuade Yahweh not to act in rage. First, Moses appeals to Yahweh’s pride, shaming Yahweh in the eyes of the Egyptians and in the eyes of the inhabitants of the land (vv. 13– 16). Second, Moses makes an alternative suggestion to Yahweh, proposing that instead of destroying recalcitrant Israel, Yahweh forgive (vv. 17– 19). The basis of this daring appeal is a direct and complete quotation of Exod 34: 6– 7, which Moses now quotes as a prayer, concerning Yahweh’s self-commitment to Israel made at Sinai, which Yahweh proposes to disregard.

Brueggemann, Walter. Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (p. 219). Fortress Press. Kindle Edition.

First known use (1728):

And the 1753 supplement to the same work:

From 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Anthropomorphism:

ANTHROPOMORPHISM (Gr. ἄνθρωπος, man, μορφή, form), the attribution (a) of a human body, or (b) of human qualities generally, to God or the gods. The word anthropomorphism is a modern coinage (possibly from 18th century French). The New English Dictionary is misled by the 1866 reprint of Paul Bayne on Ephesians when it quotes “anthropomorphist” as 17th century English. Seventeenth century editions print “anthropomorphits,” i.e. anthropomorphites, in sense (a). The older abstract term is “anthropopathy,” literally “attributing human feelings,” in sense (b).

From Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition/Anthropomorphism:

ANTHROPOMORPHISM is a term used in theological writings to denote the figure by which words expressing human organs and activities are applied to the divine Being ; in short, it is the conception and representation of God as possessed of corporeal and human properties. Originally and literally the word implied only the ascrib ing to God a physical form resembling the human body, and consequently included under it all forms of expression which attribute to Him the exercise of physical organs and senses. But its meaning was soon extended so as to comprehend all representations of God which require Him either to be in himself corporeally extended, or to possess a corporeal body as the necessary condition of His activity. In this wider sense all theories were designated anthro pomorphic, which identified God with light or the physical universe, or which placed alongside of Him a primeval, uncreated matter.

Primitive ideas of God are necessarily framed by man from the analogy of his own nature. He is, however, able to represent God to himself under the analogy of his mental or spiritual, as well as under that of his material nature. This more refined form was called anthropo- pathism, and is that mode of contemplating the divine attributes founded on the analogy of God to the human spirit All forms of expression which ascribe to God passions, intelligence, or volition, rest ultimately upon this supposed analogy. In modern theology and philosophy, it is this mode of thought that usually receives the name of anthropomorphism.

Found in full here:

In the next two verses we see two contrasting attributes of Yahweh, mercy (positive) and a consuming fire (negative).

Yahweh your Elohim is a consuming fire. (Deuteronomy 4:24, LT)

Yahweh your Elohim is a merciful El. (Deuteronomy 4:31, LT)

In Genesis 1:26 we find that the image of Elohim is male (positive) and female (negative). In Genesis 3:5 and 3:22 we see that Elohim is good (positive) and bad (negative). In Joshua 23:15 we read that Yahweh does good things (positive) and bad things (negative). In Deuteronomy 30:1 Yahweh provides blessings (positive) and curses (negative). In Isaiah 45:7 we are told that God makes peace (positive) and evil (negative).

Below is one of the most vivid passages in the entire Bible that demonstrates this positive and negative aspect of ancient philosophy.

For everything there is a season, and a time for every purpose under heaven: a time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted; a time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up; a time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance; a time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing; a time to seek, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away; a time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak; a time to love, and a time to hate; a time for war, and a time for peace. (Ecclesiastes 3:1-8, ASV)

On the 26th of April, I authored an article with some very basic counter points to William Birch’s reliance on Psalms 139:4 as a prooftext. He responded in a disingenuous way, showing that he really did not understand my arguments. On the 5th, I promised to elaborate on my points with critical thinking questions. My points are as follows (in bold) and the critical thinking questions are in plain text.

Here is the verse:

Psa 139:4 Even before a word is on my tongue, behold, O LORD, you know it altogether.

1. This verse may not be generally applicable (the fallacy of hasty generalization if Birch assumes it is). Much like a lot of what King David writes, this is more likely contextually only directly applicable to King David. Does Birch assume he has the same type of relationship with God that King David did? I should hope not. Does Birch think all of King David’s writing is applicable to all people on a 1-for-1, direct basis? I should hope not. We cannot just read other people’s mail as if it were for ourselves.

1-1 Is this verse written in 1st person singular or 1st person plural perspective?
1-2 If this verse is written in 1st person singular perspective, might the verse be limited in scope to the speaker? (This is asking if this is a possibility, however slight)
1-2a If “no”, pretend I wrote the same sentence about my daughter: “Even before a word is on my tongue, daugher, you know it altogether.” Would a random person in the mall who is shown this quote believe I am attempting to claim that my daughter knows all things past and present and future?
1-2b What would the “prima facie” reading of my statement be?
1-3 Are there any of King David’s writings that are in 1st person singular that are limited in direct applicability to only himself?
1-3a If “yes”, how does one know the difference? And how does an example verse differ from Psalms 139:4?
1-4 If this verse is meant to be read as applicable to the 1st person singular perspective, can we make the conclusion that this applies to all people, from all of time (past, present and future)?
1-4a If “yes”, what about statements I make in the 1st person singular? “I will eat stir-fry tomorrow.” Can we conclude that all people will eat stir-fry tomorrow?
1-4b What would the “prima facie” reading of my statement be?

2. Even if this verse was worded to read how Birch claims it is worded, this verse may be hyperbolic (the fallacy of equivocation if Birch assumes his definitive meaning rather than possible others). Hyperboles are everywhere, leading people to not even noticing when they are used. As an example, the last sentence was a hyperbole (“everywhere”). Language is flexible, and we should do well to avoid claiming definitive meanings without strong contextual clues.

2-1 Does the Bible ever use hyperbolic language to illustrate points?
2-2 What genre of writing is the Psalms (poetry, historical, proverbs, fable)?
2-3 The genre of Psalms, is that a genre that uses more or less hyperbole in how it writes compared to other genres?
2-4 Could Psalms 139:4 be hyperbolic?
2-4a If “no”, pretend I wrote the same sentence about my daughter: “Even before a word is on my tongue, daughter, you know it altogether.” Would a random person in the mall who is shown this quote believe I am using hyperbole or idiom to communicate something of value?
2-4b What is that thing they might say I am communicating?
2-4c What would the “prima facie” reading of my statement be?

3. This verse appears to link God testing David to God knowing David’s words (as evident by verse 1), countering the claims Birch wishes to make about this verse. The direct context points against Birch’s claims.

3-1 Does the direct context have any language about God testing or searching?
3-2 If God’s knowledge is inherent (meaning God just knows everything that possibly can be known), then why does He have to search, what does it do?
3-3 If God had to search in order to know, does this suggest God is omniscient or not-omniscient?
3-4 Pretend I wrote the same sentence about my daughter: “Daughter, you have searched me and known me!” Would a random person in the mall conclude my daughter was omniscient?
3-5 If I followed this up with “Even before a word is on my tongue, daughter, you know it altogether” would a random person in the mall believe that my daughter would know if she did not search?

4. Normal human communication allows people to make these types of statements about people they know (no omniscience necessary). Here is one Open Theist:

Even before there is a word on my tongue, Behold, my daughter knows it all. It’s uncanny. Almost like we have lived together so long she really knows me, who I am, and how I think. She will even say sometimes, ” I know what you are thinking.” And she is right.

4-1 Is this a phrase that a normal person could write?
4-1a If no, pretend I walked up to a random person in the mall and said “My daughter, even before I tell her something she knows what I am going to say. Sometimes she even just says “I know what you are thinking” and she is always right” would they think that claim was absurd?
4-1bc What would they think the “prima facie” understanding of my statement would be?
4-2 Is the father who wrote the statement claiming his daughter is omniscient?
4-3 If a random person could say the exact same thing about their daughter, and it is not a claim for omniscience, then could it also be the case that the same claim is not a claim for omniscience when applied to God?

5. Another point is that the entire context of the chapter is very clearly Open Theism. God tests to know (found both in the first and the last verses of this very chapter!). King David does not believe in total omniscience of all future events:

Psa 139:23 Search me, O God, and know my heart! Try me and know my thoughts!
Psa 139:24 And see if there be any grievous way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting!

5-1 Does David assume God has omniscience over all his future thoughts and acts?
5-1a If “yes”, why does David challenge God to test him in order to find out his “thoughts”? Why does David challenge God to “see if there be any grievous way in me”?
5-2 What is David asking God to do in these verses and how does that fit any concept of omniscience?
5-3 What would the “prima facie” reading of the verses be?

From his defense of his 1828 book “An Inquiry Into the Popular Notion of an Unoriginated, Infinite and Eternal Prescience: With a Preface Containing a Dialogue Between the Author and One of His Readers”:

My good Sir, say rather they are Christian contradictions; and as Christian contradictions they must be believed and received. I am well aware that the philosophy of religious truth may indeed be incomprehensible ; but the possibility of every Christian doctrine must be intuitively evident : or otherwise the fact can never be a subject of rational conviction. If the mystery, or rather the absurdity, of a doctrine may be argued as a valid objection to the cordial belief of it, then I am quite sure that no person can have any rational conviction of the doctrine of eternal prescience. Your argument, my good Sir, is solely and obviously against yourself. If we are not to have any thing to do with mysteries, or rather with contradictory things, then I am very sure we have no business with the doctrine of an eternal prescience.

Will Duffy, from a Facebook conversation:

When a Calvinist says that an unregenerate man is free to sin, he is lying to you. No Calvinist in the world believes that an unregenerate man is free to sin. An unregenerate man cannot sin unless God decreed for him to sin. An unregenerate man cannot freely choose what sin he wants to commit, he can only commit the sins God decreed for him to commit. According to Calvinist doctrine, God is the author of sin, not man. Man has no say in the matter.

From reknew:

A fourth argument that demonstrates the error of the deterministic interpretation of Romans 9 concerns Paul’s summary at the end of this chapter. Whenever we are struggling to understand a complex line of reasoning such as we find in Romans 9, it is crucial to pay close attention to the author’s own summary of his argument, if and when he provides one. By all accounts, Romans 9 is a difficult, complex and highly disputed passage. Fortunately, Paul provides us with a very clear summary of his argument in this chapter (vss. 30-32). Unfortunately for the deterministic interpretation, it appeals to free will as the decisive factor in determining who “receives mercy” and who gets “hardened.”

Paul begins his summary by asking, “What then shall we say?” (vs. 30). If the deterministic interpretation was correct, we would expect Paul to answer by saying something like, “The sovereign God has determined who will be elect and who will not, and no one has the right to question him.” As a matter of fact, however, Paul doesn’t say anything like this. He rather summarizes his argument by saying:

Gentiles, who did not strive for righteousness, have attained it, that is, righteousness through faith; but Israel, who did strive for the righteousness that is based on the law, did not succeed in fulfilling that law. Why not? Because they did not strive for it on the basis of faith, but as if it were based on works” (vss. 30–32).

From reknew.org:

This belief in fate or divine determinism is as tragic as it is unbiblical. Among other things, fatalism inevitably leads people to blame God for evil. If God is the ultimate cause of everything, how could this conclusion be avoided? Moreover, by undermining our freedom of choice, determinism strips us of our dignity and moral responsibility. It reduces us to pawns of fate and robs us of our potential to love. In other words, it destroys the beauty of the biblical proclamation that we are made in the image of God.

While it’s undeniable that the Bible depicts God as predestining some things, it’s also clear that free decisions do not fall into this category. To a significant extent, humans freely determine their own destiny. And the first step in understanding how an all-good God could create a world that is as messed up as the one we find ourselves in is to fully appreciate this fact.

From a post examining Paul’s points in Romans 9:

Paul is building to an overarching point, because in Paul’s theology there is no longer room for this distinction between the “priest nation” and gentiles. Paul flips this point on its head, drawing the singular point that “because God arbitrarily chose one nation over another, then God is not wrong to disband that arbitrary choice.” Paul, being an Open Theist, is saying that God can revoke his promises, especially when those promised are not based on merit.

From Thomas Jay Oord‘s blog:

Peirce’s inability to measure reality with absolute precision led him to conclude that a measure of spontaneity exists in the world. The world is not a determined machine, and chance emerging from spontaneity is inevitable. In fact, chance is irreducible, because randomness is a fundamental fact of life. Chance is genuine.

Peirce’s conclusions about the role of randomness ring true today. A number of philosophers accept that chance, randomness, unpredictability, and imprecision characterize existence, although specialists debate how best to speak of each. In this debate, philosophers sometimes use “random” to describe the product of a series of events and “chance” to describe the process of a single instance. There is no consensus on how best to conceptualize them in relation to each other. But the consensus among contemporary philosophers seems to be that randomness and chance is real.

For full post, click here.

From H Roy Elseth’s Did God Know:

It is also quite common in Christian circles to hear the statements: “If we could prove God, He would not be God,” “If we could fully understand God, then we would be equal to Him,” or “If we could fully understand Him, He could not be God.” This is incredible subjective reasoning. It is just as logical as saying, if you could fully understand the workings of a television set or prove how it functions, then you would become a television set. Most of us would agree that God fully understands the principles of television. Does that mean then that we can absurdly reason that God is a television set?

From Beau Ballentine on the official God is Open Facebook group:

Revelation 13:8

All who dwell on the earth will worship him, whose names have not been written in the Book of Life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.

If Christ had been slain previously, before the foundation of the world, then there would have been no need for the righteous dead to wait in Abraham’s Bosom “until the death of the one who is high priest in those days.”