Subjects and predicates, when referring to natural and composite entities, are not merely distinct as terms in our statements; the distinctions in terms reflect real distinctions in the things themselves about which we speak. The temptation is to think that since our speech generally functions this way with respect to creatures, then it must also work this way when we speak of God. But herein lies the difficulty: a simple God is not composed of parts; thus, His being cannot be directly directly mapped onto any multipart statements we make about Him.
Divine simplicity accordingly insists on an inescapable incapacity and inadequacy in all our God-talk. We can have only complex propositions and thoughts about the simple God. We cannot discover the manner of God’s being by attempting to read it off the surface grammar of our propositions about Him. The shape of our propositional statements is only suited to correspond in a one-to-one manner to multipart and composite beings.
Dolezal, James E.. All That Is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism . Reformation Heritage Books. Kindle Edition.