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Appeal to Mystery

Bavinck, Herman
To say that God is the infinite One and can and does nevertheless reveal himself in finite creatures, though this belief is a recognition of an incomprehensible mystery— the miracle of creation, after all— is by no means the admission of a palpable absurdity. The finite cannot diminish the infinity of God if it is only grounded in God’s Absolute being.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 23). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Dolezal, James
It should be readily confessed that the exact function of free will in God who is himself pure act is beyond the scope of human knowledge. Just as we cannot comprehend God as ipsum esse subsistens, we cannot comprehend the identity between God as eternal, immutable, pure act and his will for the world as free and uncoerced. Though we discover strong reasons for confessing both simplicity and freedom in God, we cannot form an isomorphically adequate notion of how this is the case. In fact, this confession of ignorance is precisely what one finds in the Thomist and Reformed traditions.
Dolezal, James E.. God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (pp. 210-211). Pickwick Publications, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

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Anthropomorphism

Bavinck, Herman
We rightly use anthropomorphic language because God accommodated himself to creatures by revealing his name in and through creatures. We cannot see God himself; we can only see him in his works and name him in accordance with his self-revelation in his works. To deny this is to deny the possibility of knowing God at all. Some philosophers (Plato, Hegel) have tried to get around this by rejecting concrete representations of God in favor of abstractions such as the Absolute, the One, Life, or Reason. But, since these too are anthropomorphisms, they fail to solve the problem.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 69). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Creation

Bavinck, Herman
On this basis Christian theology almost unanimously teaches that the glory of God is the final goal of all God’s works. Although in its early years theologians especially featured the goodness of God as the motive for creation, still the honor of God as the final end of all things is not lacking.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 407). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

But a twofold objection has been registered against God’s glory as the final goal of all creatures. First, on this view God is made self-centered, self-seeking, devaluing his creatures, specifically human beings, into means. We already confronted this objection earlier and demonstrated that as the perfect good, God can rest in nothing other than himself and cannot be satisfied in anything less than himself. He has no alternative but to seek his own honor. Just as a father in his family and a ruler in his kingdom must seek and demand the honor due to him in that capacity, so it is with the Lord our God. Now a human being can only ask for the honor that is due to him in the name of God and for the sake of the office to which God has called him, but God asks for and seeks that honor in his own name and for his own being. Inasmuch as he is the supreme and only good, perfection itself, it is the highest kind of justice that in all creatures he seek his own honor.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 408). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

But though he wills all creatures as means and for his own sake, he wills some more than others to the degree they are more direct and suitable means for his glorification.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 215). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Determinism

Bavinck, Herman
Now, Reformed theologians all agree that sin and its punishment are willed and determined by God. It is also perfectly true that words like “permission” and “foreknowledge” in fact in no way contribute to the solution of difficulties. The questions, after all, remain precisely the same: Why did God, knowing everything in advance, create humans with the capacity to fall, and why did he not prevent the fall? Why did he allow all humans to fall in the fall of one person? Why does he not have the gospel preached to all humans, and why does he not bestow faith on all? In short, if God foreknows a thing and permits it, he does that either willingly or unwillingly. The latter is impossible. Accordingly, only the former is a real option: God’s permission is efficacious, an act of his will. Nor should it be supposed that the notion of permission is of any value or force against the charge that God is the author of sin, for one who permits someone to sin and hence to perish, although he is in a position to prevent it from happening, is as guilty as he who incites someone to sin. On the other hand, all agree also that sin, though not outside of the power of God’s will, is and remains nevertheless contrary to his will, that it is not a means to the ultimate goal but a serious disruption of God’s creation, and therefore that Adam’s fall [into sin] was not a forward step but most certainly a fall. It also has to be granted that, though we can with good reason take exception to such terms as “permission,” “foreknowledge,” “preterition,” and “dereliction,” no one is able to come up with better ones.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 361). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Admittedly, sin cannot be traced to a bare foreknowledge and permission of God. The fall, sin, and eternal punishment are included in the divine decree and in a sense willed by God, but then always only in a certain sense and not in the same manner as grace and blessedness. God takes delight in the latter, but sin and punishment are not occasions of pleasure or joy to God. When he makes sin subservient to his honor, he does it by his omnipotence, but this is contrary to the nature of sin. And when he punishes the wicked, he does not delight in their suffering as such; rather, in this punishment he celebrates the triumph of his perfections (Deut. 28: 63; Ps. 2: 4; Prov. 1: 26; Lam. 3: 33). And though on the one hand, with a view to the comprehensive and immutable character of God’s counsel, there is no objection to speaking of a “double predestination,” on the other hand we must bear in mind that in the one case predestination is of a different nature than in the other. “Predestination is the disposition, end, and ordering of a means to an end.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 363). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Because humans are rational, moral beings, God does not deal mechanically with them but speaks and acts in keeping with their nature. Just as a father forbids a child to use a sharp knife, though he himself uses it without any ill results, so God forbids us rational creatures to commit the sin that he himself can and does use as a means of glorifying his name. Hence, God’s hidden will and his revealed will are not really incompatible, as the usual objection has it.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 218). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

For in the first place, God’s revealed (preceptive) will is not really his (ultimate) will but only the command he issues as the rule for our conduct. In his preceptive will he does not say what he will do; it is not the rule for his conduct; it does not prescribe what God must do, but tells us what we must do. It is the rule for our conduct (Deut. 29: 29). It is only in a metaphorical sense, therefore, that it is called the will of God. Against this view it is objected that the revealed will bears that name because it reveals what he really wills and hence that it must be in harmony with his secret will. And this— second— is indeed the case: the revealed will is an indication of what God wills that we will do. God’s secret will and his revealed will are not diametrically opposed to each other, as though according to the former God willed sin, but according to the latter he did not; as though according to the former he does not will the salvation of all, but according to the latter he does. Also, according to his secret will God takes no pleasure in sin; it is never the object of his delight. He does not afflict any person for the pleasure of afflicting that person. Conversely, even according to his preceptive will God does not will the salvation of everyone individually. With a view to history no one can seriously entertain the notion that he does. Actually the “all” in 1 Timothy 2: 4 is restricted to a larger or smaller circle by every interpreter. The two wills, the secret and the revealed, are so far from being opposed to each other that the revealed will is precisely the way in which the secret will is brought to realization. It is in the way of admonitions and warnings, prohibitions and threats, conditions and demands that God carries out his counsel, while God’s secret will only insures that human beings violating God’s commandment do not for a moment become independent of God, but in the very moment of violating it serve the counsel of God and become, however unwillingly, instruments of his glory.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (pp. 218-219). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Foreknowledge

Bavinck, Herman
Consequently— strictly speaking— one cannot speak of foreknowledge in the case of God: with him there are no “distinctions of time.”[ 71] He calls the things that are not as if they were and sees what is not as if it already existed. “For what is foreknowledge if not knowledge of future events? But can anything be future to God, who surpasses all times? For if God’s knowledge includes these very things themselves, they are not future to him but present; and for this reason we should no longer speak of God’s foreknowledge but simply of God’s knowledge.”[
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2: God and Creation (pp. 170-171). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

The doctrine of middle knowledge, however, represents contingent future events as contingent and free also in relation to God. This is with reference not only to God’s predestination but also his foreknowledge, for just as in Origen, things do not happen because God knows them, but God foreknows them because they are going to happen. Hence, the sequence is not necessary knowledge, the knowledge of vision, the decree to create (etc.); instead, it is necessary knowledge, middle knowledge, decree to create (etc.), and the knowledge of vision. God does not derive his knowledge of the free actions of human beings from his own being, his own decrees, but from the will of creatures. God, accordingly, becomes dependent on the world, derives knowledge from the world that he did not have and could not obtain from himself, and hence, in his knowledge, ceases to be one, simple, and independent— that is, God. Conversely, the creature in large part becomes independent vis-à-vis God. It did indeed at one time receive “being” (esse) and “being able” (posse) from God but now it has the “volition” (velle) completely in its own hand. It sovereignly makes it own decisions and either accomplishes something or does not accomplish something apart from any preceding divine decree. Something can therefore come into being quite apart from God’s will. The creature is now creator, autonomous, sovereign; the entire history of the world is taken out of God’s controlling hands and placed into human hands. First, humans decide; then God responds with a plan that corresponds to that decision.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 175). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Shedd, William
God’s omniscience, from the creature’s point of view, is foreknowledge; but it is not foreknowledge from God’s point of view.
William G. T. Shedd. Dogmatic Theology (Kindle Locations 4864-4865). Monergism Books. Kindle Edition.

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Free Will

Bavinck, Herman
Therefore, along with Augustine, we must seek the solution of the problem in another direction. The freedom of the will does not, as we will discover later, consist in indifference, arbitrariness, or chance, but in “rational delight.” This rational delight, rather than being in conflict with the foreknowledge of God, is implied in and upheld by it. The human will, along with its nature, antecedents and motives, its decisions and consequences, is integrated into “the order of causes that is certain to God and embraced by his foreknowledge.”[ 101] In the knowledge of God things are interrelated in the same web of connections in which they occur in reality. It is not foreknowledge, nor is it predestination, that now and then intervenes from above with compelling force; every human decision and act is motivated, rather, by that which precedes it, and in that web of connections it is included in the knowledge of God. In keeping with their own divinely known and ordained nature, contingent events and free actions are links in the order of causes that, little by little, is revealed to us in the history of the world.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (pp. 176-177). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

We can almost never tell why God willed one thing rather than another, and are therefore compelled to believe that he could just as well have willed one thing as another. But in God there is actually no such thing as choice inasmuch as it always presupposes uncertainty, doubt, and deliberation. He, however, knows what he wills— eternally, firmly, and immutably. Every hint of arbitrariness, contingency, or uncertainty is alien to his will, which is eternally determinate and unchanging. Contingency characterizes creatures and— let it be said in all reverence— not even God can deprive the creature of this characteristic. In God alone existence and essence are of one piece; by virtue of its very nature, a creature is such that it could also not have existed.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (pp. 213-214). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Immutability

Bavinck, Herman
If God were not immutable, he would not be God.[ 18] His name is “being,” and this name is “an unalterable name.” All that changes ceases to be what it was. But true being belongs to him who does not change. That which truly is remains. That which changes “was something and will be something but is not anything because it is mutable.”[ 19] But God who is cannot change, for every change would diminish his being. Furthermore, God is as immutable in his knowing, willing, and decreeing as he is in his being. “The essence of God by which he is what he is, possesses nothing changeable, neither in eternity, nor in truthfulness, nor in will.”[ 20] As he is, so he knows and wills— immutably. “For even as you totally are, so do you alone totally know, for you immutably are, and you know immutably, and you will immutably. Your essence knows and wills immutably, and your knowledge is and wills immutably, and your will is and knows immutably.”[ 21] Neither creation, nor revelation, nor incarnation (affects, etc.) brought about any change in God. No new plan ever arose in God. In God there was always one single immutable will. “[ In God the former purpose is not altered and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but] by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will he effected regarding the things he created, both that formerly, so long as they were not, they should not be, and that subsequently, when they began to be, they should come into existence.”
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 128). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Berkhof, Louis
The Immutability of God is a necessary concomitant of His aseity. It is that perfection of God by which He is devoid of all change, not only in His Being, but also in His perfections, and in His purposes and promises. In virtue of this attribute He is exalted above all becoming, and is free from all accession or diminution and from all growth or decay in His Being or perfections. His knowledge and plans, His moral principles and volitions remain forever the same. Even reason teaches us that no change is possible in God, since a change is either for better or for worse. But in God, as the absolute Perfection, improvement and deterioration are both equally impossible. This immutability of God is clearly taught in such passages of Scripture as Ex. 3: 14; Ps. 102: 26-28; Isa. 41: 4; 48: 12; Mal. 3: 6; Rom. 1: 23; Heb. 1: 11,12; Jas. 1: 17.
Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology (p. 46). . Kindle Edition.

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Impassibility

Dolezal, James
He is metaphysically changeless. Such changelessness in turn entails divine impassibility, an idea frequently misunderstood and derided. But impassibility is not to be confused, as it often is, with impassivity or with dispassion. Although it may seem paradoxical, the stress on impassibility is meant to safeguard the fullness of God’s character. He is eternally impassioned, unwaveringly good, not moody or fitful as he is buffeted by the changes of his life, some of them, perhaps, unexpected changes.
Dolezal, James E.. God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness . Pickwick Publications, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

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Ineffibility

Bavinck, Herman
To a considerable extent we can assent to and wholeheartedly affirm this doctrine of the unknowability of God. Scripture and the church emphatically assert the unsearchable majesty and sovereign highness of God. There is no knowledge of God as he is in himself. We are human and he is the Lord our God. There is no name that fully expresses his being, no definition that captures him. He infinitely transcends our picture of him, our ideas of him, our language concerning him. He is not comparable to any creature. All the nations are accounted by him as less than nothing and vanity. “God has no name. He cannot be defined.” He can be apprehended; he cannot be comprehended.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 21). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Hypostatic Union

Bavinck, Herman
It is essentially expansive. In God, however, there is no separation or division. The unfolding of his being into personality immediately, absolutely, and completely coincides with, and includes, the unfolding of his being into persons, as well as that of the immanent relations expressed in the names “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit.” Thus God is archetypically related to humanity. That which in the case of human beings is separate and juxtaposed, extended in space and over time, is eternally and simply present in God. The processions in his being simultaneously bring about in God his absolute personality, his trinitarian character, and his immanent relations. They are the absolute archetypes of all those processions by which human nature achieves its full development in the individual, in the family, and in humanity as a whole. For that reason the three persons, though distinct from each other, are not different. The “threeness” derives from, exists in, and serves the “oneness.” The unfolding of the divine being occurs within that being, thus leaving the oneness and simplicity of that being undiminished. Furthermore, although the three persons do not differ in essence, they are distinct subjects, hypostases, or subsistences, which precisely for that reason bring about within the being of God the complete unfolding of that being. Finally, the three persons are, by generation and spiration, related to each other in an absolute manner; their personal distinctness as subjects completely coincides with their immanent interpersonal relationships. The Father is only and eternally Father; the Son is only and eternally Son; the Spirit is only and eternally Spirit. And inasmuch as each person is himself in an eternal, simple, and absolute manner, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. The Father is God as Father; the Son is God as Son; the Holy Spirit is God as Holy Spirit. And inasmuch as all three are God, they all partake of one single divine nature. Hence, there is but one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 280). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Negative Theology

Bavinck, Herman
But according to Plotinus nothing can be said of God that is not negative. God is absolutely one— above all plurality— and therefore not describable in terms of thought or the good, not even in terms of being, for all these determinations still imply a certain plurality. As pure unity, God is indeed the cause of thought, being, and the good, but he himself is distinct from them and transcends them. He is unbounded, infinite, without form, and so altogether different from every creature that not even activity, life, thought, consciousness, or being can be ascribed to him. He is inapprehensible by our thought and language. We cannot say what he is, only what he is not. Even the terms “the One” and “the Good,” which Plotinus usually employs, do not describe his essence but only his relation to his creatures, and only denote his absolute causality.[
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 9). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Hodge, Charles
This principle of classification is perhaps the one most generally adopted. It gives rise, however, really but to two classes, namely, the positive and negative, i.e., those in which something is affirmed, and those in which something is denied concerning God. To the negative class are commonly referred simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability; to the positive class, power, knowledge, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Instead of calling the one class negative and the other positive, they are often distinguished as absolute and relative. By an absolute attribute is meant one which belongs to God, considered in Himself, and which implies no relation to other beings; by a relative attribute is meant one which implies relation to an object. They are also distinguished as immanent and transient, as communicable and incommunicable. These terms are used interchangeably. They do not express different modes of classification, but are different modes of designating the same classification. Negative, absolute, immanent, and incommunicable, are designations of one class; and positive, relative, transitive, and communicable, are designations of the other class.
Hodge, Charles, Systematic Theology, Vol 1

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Omnipresence

Bavinck, Herman
Infinity in the sense of not being confined by space is synonymous with God’s omnipresence. While heaven and earth cannot contain God, neither can he be excluded from space. Rather, he fills heaven and earth with his presence. This omnipresence includes God’s being as well as his power. God is not “somewhere,” yet he fills heaven and earth; he is uniquely a place of his own to himself. Here again, we need to remind ourselves that in each attribute we speak of God in human terms. God relates to space as the infinite One who, existing within himself, also fills to repletion every point of space and sustains it by his immensity.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 123). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Frame, John
Divine immensity is to space what God’s atemporal eternity is to time. It does not mean merely that God is omnipresent in space, but that he transcends space altogether. As I argued in the preceding chapter that God is both atemporal and omnipresent in time, I will here maintain that he is both aspatial (immense) and also omnipresent in space.530
Frame, John M.. Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief (p. 383). P&R Publishing. Kindle Edition.

If, as I will argue, God is not a corporeal being, spatial omnipresence cannot mean that God is a physical substance spread through the material universe. What it means, rather, is that God’s power, knowledge, and ability to act in the finite world532 are universal. God can instantly act at any place; he knows everything that happens, and he personally governs and directs everything in the universe (from above and from below, as we saw in chapter 9). So omnipresence is a direct implication of God’s lordship, in his control and authority, as well as his covenant presence. We discussed the universality of his power, knowledge, and involvement with his world in other contexts, and so nothing more really needs to be said to establish the doctrine of divine omnipresence.
Frame, John M.. Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief (p. 386). P&R Publishing. Kindle Edition.

MacArthur, John
Specifics of Immensity and Omnipresence. God transcends space. He is inherently immense and omnipresent, regardless of the existence of time and matter— that is, he is always present with himself. He is also immense and omnipresent with relation to the creation. Space is an aspect of creation, so it is not part of God. These perfections mean that God is not diffused through space so that only part of him is in each place. Also, God is not bound to one place. God is fully present in every place, but he is also sustaining space by his immensity. His immensity does not mean he is separate from creation in a deistic sense, even though it does mean he is distinct from and greater than creation. God upholds the created order by being entirely present with every point of space. This is true, for example, in both heaven and hell (e.g., Rev. 14: 9– 10) and in the righteous and the wicked. Actually, it is better to say that God is with time and space, rather than being in time and space (against nineteenth-century liberalism’s concept of God as only immanent). But both are correct, provided that one does not see God as of or bound by time.
MacArthur, John; Mayhue, Richard. Biblical Doctrine (Kindle Locations 4361-4370). Crossway. Kindle Edition.

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Omniscience

Bavinck, Herman
Premise three says a being’s omniscience entails that a being has all experiential knowledge. Omniscience entails that a being has all experiential knowledge. That, I would say, is false. That is not the classical definition of omniscience. Remember, I said to be omniscient a being must know every true proposition p and believe no false proposition. So that means that omniscience is defined in terms of propositional truth, not in terms of experiential truth. So being omniscient does not entail, for example, knowing how it feels to have a sore back. God knows that having a sore back involves having pain and is uncomfortable, that’s propositional knowledge. But God doesn’t know himself what it’s like for his back to be sore, because he doesn’t have a back. Or he doesn’t know how it feels himself to be a sinner. Now, he knows the proposition that being a sinner feels lousy, feels guilty, feels depressing, he knows those propositions, but he doesn’t know how it feels to be himself a sinner. Or he doesn’t know what it is to be himself Bill Craig. He knows how Bill Craig feels, that’s propositional knowledge. But he doesn’t have to have the experiential knowledge of believing that he is himself Bill Craig. You see what I mean? So classically omniscience is not defined in terms of non-propositional knowledge. It is defined in terms of propositional knowledge, and there is no incoherence with God having all propositional knowledge. So, again, the objector here is saying that God cannot have the experiential knowledge of knowing what it is like to learn something. Now, I think that’s false, as I’ve already explained, I think God does know what that’s like, but that’s not entailed by omniscience. God doesn’t need to have experiential non-propositional knowledge in order to be propositionally omniscient. And that is what the doctrine of omniscience means.
William Lane Craig

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Omniscience, Active

Bavinck, Herman
…all are known to God. He knows everything (1 John 3: 20). This knowledge is not a posteriori, obtained by observation, but a priori, present from eternity (1 Cor. 2: 7; Rom. 8: 29; Eph. 1: 4– 5; 2 Tim. 1: 9). His knowledge is not susceptible of increase (Isa. 40: 13f.; Rom. 11: 34);
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2: God and Creation (p. 166). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Berkhof, Louis
1. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. The knowledge of God may be defined as that perfection of God whereby He, in an entirely unique manner, knows Himself and all things possible and actual in one eternal and most simple act…

The knowledge of God differs in some important points from that of men. It is archetypal, which means that He knows the universe as it exists in His own eternal idea previous to its existence as a finite reality in time and space; and that His knowledge is not, like ours, obtained from without. It is a knowledge that is characterized by absolute perfection. As such it is intuitive rather than demonstrative or discursive. It is innate and immediate, and does not result from observation or from a process of reasoning. Being perfect, it is also simultaneous and not successive, so that He sees things at once in their totality, and not piecemeal one after another. Furthermore, it is complete and fully conscious, while man’s knowledge is always partial, frequently indistinct, and often fails to rise into the clear light of consciousness.
Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology (p. 54). . Kindle Edition.

Boyce, James Petigru
How does God know? or in what way does he possess knowledge?

1. Not as we gain it, by using faculties fitted to acquire it. There is in him nothing corresponding to observation, comparison, generalization, deduction, processes of reasoning, by which we pass from one step to another, or the contemplation or conjecture of suppositions or theories by which we account for facts.

2. It is even improper to speak of his knowing by intuition, as is frequently done.

3. All that we can say is that his knowledge is his essence or nature knowing. It is not something acquired, but something belonging to that nature itself and identical with it, in like manner as are his love, and truth, and justice. It is something so inherent in his nature that it exists exclusively of any means of attaining or perceiving it, which we call action.

4. The knowledge of God, therefore, not being acquired, cannot be increased. Time does not add to it. Succession of events does not bring it before God. All the objects of his knowledge are to him eternally present and known.
James Petigru Boyce, Systematic Theology

Charnock, Stephen
Prop. III. God knows all things independently. This is essential to an infinite understanding. He receives not his knowledge from anything without him; he hath no tutor to instruct him, or book to inform him: “Who hath been his counsellor?’ saith the prophet (Isa. xl. 13); he hath no need of the counsels of others, nor of the instructions of others. This follows upon the first and second propositions; if he knows things by his essence, then, as his essence is independent from the creatures, so is his knowledge; he borrows not any images from the creature; hath no species or pictures of things in his understanding, as we have; no beams from the creature strike upon him to enlighten him, but beams from him upon the world; the earth sends not light to the sun, but the sun to the earth. Our knowledge, indeed, depends upon the object, but all created objects depend upon God’s knowledge and will; we could not know creatures unless they were; but creatures could not be unless God knew them. As nothing that he wills is the cause of his will, so nothing that he knows is the cause of his knowledge; he did not make things to know them, but he knows them to make them: who will imagine that the mark of the foot in the dust is the cause that the foot stands in this or that particular place? If his knowledge did depend upon the things, then the existence of things did preceed God’s knowledge of them: to say that they are the cause of God’s knowledge, is to say that God was not the cause of their being; and if he did create them, it was effected by a blind and ignorant power; he created he knew not what, till he had produced it. If he be beholden for his knowledge to the creatures he hath made, he had then no knowledge of them before he made them. If his knowledge were dependent upon them, it could not be eternal, but must have a beginning when the creatures had a beginning, and be of no longer a date than since the nature of things was in actual existence; for whatsoever is a cause of knowledge, doth precede the knowledge it causes, either in order of time, or order of nature: temporal things, therefore, cannot be the cause of that knowledge which is eternal. His works could not be foreknown to him, if his knowledge commenced with the existence of his works (Acts xv. 18): if he knew them before he made them, he could not derive a knowledge from them after they were made. He made all things in wisdom (Ps. civ. 24). How can this be imagined, if the things known where the cause of his knowledge, and so before his knowledge, and therefore before his action? s God would not then be the first in the order of knowing agents, because he would not act by knowledge, but act before he knew, and know after he had acted; and so the creature which he made would be before the act of his understanding, whereby he knew what he made. Again, since knowledge is a perfection, if God’s knowledge of the creatures depended upon the creatures, he would derive an excellency from them, they would derive no excellency from any idea in the Divine mind; he would not be infinitely perfect in himself; if his perfection in knowledge were gained from anything without himself and below himself, he would not be sufficient of himself, but be under an indigence, which wanted a supply from the things he had made, and could not be eternally perfect till he had created and seen the effects of his own power, goodness, and wisdom, to render him more wise and knowing in time than he was from eternity. “Who can fancy such a God as this without destroying the Deity he pretends to adore? for if his understanding be perfected by something without him, why may not his essence be perfected by something without him; that, as he was made knowing by something without him, he might be made God by something without him? How could his understanding be infinite if it depended upon a finite object, as upon a cause? Is the majesty of God to be debased to a mendicant condition, to seek for a supply from things inferior to himself? Is it to be imagined that a fool, a toad, a fly, should be assistant to the knowledge of God? that the most noble being should be perfected by things so vile; that the Supreme Cause of all things should receive any addition of knowledge, and be determined in his understanding, by the notion of things so mean? To conclude this particular, all things depend upon Ins knowledge, his knowledge depends upon nothing, but is as independent as himself and his own essence.
Charnock, Stephen. The Existence and Attributes of God (Kindle Locations 9815-9820). . Kindle Edition.

Dolezal, James
The traditional Thomist and Reformed scholastic response to these challenges has been to claim that God does not possess his knowledge of diverse things through the reception of multiple intelligible species or forms in his intellect, but, rather, has this vast knowledge of things in knowing his own essence as imitable. Additionally, the claim that God is pure act seems to proscribe the possibility that he ever receives knowledge or comes to know things.
Dolezal, James E.. God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (p. 165). Pickwick Publications, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Inasmuch as there is no real distinction in God between supposit and nature there is no reason to suppose that his self-knowledge is possessed by way of in-formation or discursive reasoning. God is the divinity by which he is divine and thus knows himself by himself. This self-knowledge, furthermore, is not an act of self-impressed knowledge by way of self-representation. That is, God does not cause himself to know himself. Rather, he just is that act of knowledge by which he knows himself.
Dolezal, James E.. God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (p. 167). Pickwick Publications, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Frame, John
If human knowledge is dependent on God, then God’s own knowledge depends on God. That is, it is self-attesting, self-referential, self-sufficient.410 His knowledge is the ultimate justified, true belief: He is the ultimate justification of knowledge, the standard for creaturely knowledge and his own.411 He is the ultimate truth: the truth is what he is and what he has decreed to be. And this justification and this truth are enclosed in God’s ultimate mind, ultimate subjectivity, ultimate belief. So as many theologians have taught, God’s knowledge depends only on himself. God knows all things by (1) knowing himself, and (2) knowing his own plan for the universe.
Frame, John M.. Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief (p. 306). P&R Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Giesler, Norman
God know the same things we do, but he doc not know them the same way we know them. Our knowledge is discursive or inferential, moving from premise to conclusion . In human knowledge there is twofold discursiveness : where one thing is known after another, and where one thing is known through another. But God can not know things sequentially, since he is timeless and knows all things eternally at once. Nor can God know things inferentially, for he is simple and knows all things through the oneness of himself. Therefore, God cannot know anything discursively, inasmuch as discursive knowledge implies a limitation on the part of the knower.

Furthermore, even though God knows other things than himself, nonetheless, he knows them in and through himself. For God does not know other things through himself either successively or inferentially but simultaneously and intuitively. In brief, God knows the created effects in himself intuitively but not through himself in a discursive way. This is not an imperfection in God ‘s knowledge but a perfection. For God ‘s knowledge is more perfect precisely because he does not have to know things discursively or sequentially through their causes but knows them directly and intuitively.
Norman Giesler, Creating God in the Image of Man

(1) God does not really have foreknowledge; He simply knows in one eternal Now.
(2) God’s knowledge is not based on anything outside Himself. God’s knowledge of all things is based on knowing Himself and all other things as they preexist in Himself as their Primary Cause.
Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology v2.

Grudem, Wayne
Our definition of God’s knowledge speaks of God knowing everything in one “simple act.” Here again the word simple is used in the sense “not divided into parts.” This means that God is always fully aware of everything. If he should wish to tell us the number of grains of sand on the seashore or the number of stars in the sky, he would not have to count them all quickly like some kind of giant computer, nor would he have to call the number to mind because it was something he had not thought about for a time. Rather, he always knows all things at once. All of these facts and all other things that he knows are always fully present in his consciousness. He does not have to reason to conclusions or ponder carefully before he answers, for he knows the end from the beginning, and he never learns and never forgets anything (cf. Ps. 90:4; 2 Peter 3:8; and the verses cited above on God’s perfect knowledge). Every bit of God’s knowledge is always fully present in his consciousness; it never grows dim or fades into his nonconscious memory. Finally, the definition talks about God’s knowledge as not only a simple act but also an “eternal act.” This means that God’s knowledge never changes or grows. If he were ever to learn something new, he would not have been omniscient beforehand. Thus, from all eternity God has known all things that would happen and all things that he would do.
Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology

Hodge, Charles
This knowledge of God is not only all-comprehending, but it is intuitive and immutable. He knows all things as they are, being as being, phenomena as phenomena, the possible as possible, the actual as actual, the necessary as necessary, the free as free, the past as past, the present as present, the future as future. Although all things are ever present in his view, yet He sees them as successive in time. The vast procession of events, thoughts, feelings, and acts, stands open to his view.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology v1.

MacArthur, John
The Eternal Priority of God’s Knowledge. God’s knowledge is eternal and a priori (“ from the previous,” i.e., proceeding from a known or assumed cause to a necessarily related effect), not a posteriori (“ from the subsequent,” i.e., from particulars to principles, from effects to causes). God’s knowledge precedes all things outside God, never being derived from reality outside himself (Rom. 8: 29; 1 Cor. 2: 7; Eph. 1: 4– 5; 2 Tim. 1: 9). God’s knowledge is also perfect, never increasing (Isa. 40: 13– 14; Rom. 11: 34). It is definite— clearly defined, precise, certain, sure, and comprehensive (Ps. 139: 1– 3; Heb. 4: 13). And God’s knowledge is eternally active, never passive, because God’s essence is eternally active.
MacArthur, John; Mayhue, Richard. Biblical Doctrine (Kindle Locations 4406-4411). Crossway. Kindle Edition.

God’s omniscience is his perfect knowing of himself, all actual things outside himself, and all things that do not become reality in one eternal and simple (not having any parts but having distinctions) act (exertion of energy). One should note that this definition does not say that God knows things that are “possible,” because in God’s eternal mind and plan there are only actual things, not possible things. He does know what would have occurred if circumstances had been different, but since in his mind and plan they never would occur, they are not “possibilities.” Only what is in God’s plan is “possible,” because only that could ever become reality in time.
MacArthur, John; Mayhue, Richard. Biblical Doctrine (Kindle Locations 4387-4391). Crossway. Kindle Edition.

Oden, Thomas
How can we get our sluggish intellects in touch with the awesome conception that God knows all? The divine omniscience is best viewed as the infinite consciousness of God in relation to all possible objects of knowledge. God knows past, present, and future (John of Damascus, OF 2.10). God knows external events and inward motivations (Hilary, On Trin. 9.29). God does not perceive fragmentarily as humans perceive, as if from a particular nexus of time, but knows exhaustively, in eternal simultaneity (Irenaeus, Ag. Her. 2.26-8; Catherine of Siena, Prayers 7)…
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We know some things, but God knows incomparably more, greater, and better (Ambrose, To Gratian on Chr. Faith 5.6; Augustine, On Trin. 15.22; CG 12.18; Tho. Aq., ST 1 Q14.13). “The eyes of the Lord are everywhere” (Prov. 15:3; Benedict of Nursia, Rule, 19), implying that God sees all simultaneously. God knows objects as distanced from one another, but not from God, for there can be no distance of any object from God (Augustine, CG 5.11). God’s knowing is said to be (a) eternally actual, not merely possible; (b) eternally perfect, as distinguished from a knowledge that begins, increases, decreases, or ends; (c) complete instead of partial; and (d) both direct and immediate, instead of indirectly reflected or mediated (Tho. Aq., SCG 1. 63-71).
Oden, Thomas Classic Christianity: A Systematic Theology

Strong, Augustus
(b) Since it is free from all imperfection, God’s knowledge is immediate, as distinguished from the knowledge that comes through sense or imagination; simultaneous, as not acquired by successive observations, or built up by processes of reasoning ; distinct, as free from all vagueness or confusion; true, as perfectly corresponding to the reality of things; eternal, as comprehended in one timeless act of the divine mind.
Augustus Strong, Systematic Theology

Shedd, William
The Divine knowlege is (a) Intuitive, as opposed to demonstrative or discursive; it is not obtained by comparing one thing with another, or deducing one truth from another; it is a direct vision. (5) Simultaneous, as opposed to successive; it is not received gradually into the mind, and by parts; the perception is total, and instantaneous. (c) Complete and certain, as opposed to incomplete and uncertain. The Divine knowledge excludes knowledge by the senses, gradual acquisition of knowledge, forgetting of knowledge, and recollection of knowledge.
William G. T. Shedd. Dogmatic Theology (Kindle Locations 4860-4864). Monergism Books. Kindle Edition.

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Platonic Change

Bavinck, Herman
All that changes ceases to be what it was. But true being belongs to him who does not change. That which truly is remains. That which changes “was something and will be something but is not anything because it is mutable.”[ 19] But God who is cannot change, for every change would diminish his being.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 128). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Berkhof, Louis
Even reason teaches us that no change is possible in God, since a change is either for better or for worse. But in God, as the absolute Perfection, improvement and deterioration are both equally impossible.
Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology (p. 46). . Kindle Edition.

Cheung, Vincent
The IMMUTABILITY of God follows from his eternity. Since there is no “before” or “after” with God, he remains the same in his being and character. This attribute is also associated with his perfection. If God is perfect in every way, then any change in him must be for the worse. But since he is immutable, he cannot change for the worse. And since he is already perfect in every way, he has no need to change or develop.
Cheung, Vincent. Systematic Theology (Kindle Locations 1397-1400). Lulu.com. Kindle Edition.

Grudem, Wayne
f. The Importance of God’s Unchangeableness: At first it may not seem very important to us to affirm God’s unchangeableness. The idea is so abstract that we may not immediately realize its significance. But if we stop for a moment to imagine what it would be like if God could change, the importance of this doctrine becomes more clear. For example, if God could change (in his being, perfections, purposes, or promises), then any change would be either for the better or for the worse. But if God changed for the better, then he was not the best possible being when we first trusted him. And how could we be sure that he is the best possible being now? But if God could change for the worse (in his very being), then what kind of God might he become? Might he become, for instance, a little bit evil rather than wholly good? And if he could become a little bit evil, then how do we know he could not change to become largely evil—or wholly evil? And there would be not one thing we could do about it, for he is so much more powerful than we are. Thus, the idea that God could change leads to the horrible possibility that thousands of years from now we might come to live forever in a universe dominated by a wholly evil, omnipotent God. It is hard to imagine any thought more terrifying. How could we ever trust such a God who could change? How could we ever commit our lives to him?
Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology

Ware, Bruce
Through much of the history of the church, God has also been understood as absolutely immutable in every respect. After all, it was often reasoned , if God can change, then that changeability must indicate a change for the better or a change for the worse. But if for the better, then he was not God before; and if for the worse, then he no longer can rightly be conceived as God.
Ware, Bruce (2008-05-15). Perspectives on the Doctrine of God (p. 90). B&;H Publishing. Kindle Edition.

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Pure Being

Bavinck, Herman
Our knowledge of God is not, in fact cannot be, exhaustive; it is analogical and ectypal. But it is true knowledge, and because God’s attributes are identical with his being, we can speak truly about God as he really is. Since in his perfections God is both absolutely superior to us and in fellowship with his creatures, each of his attributes can be said, in different senses, to be both incommunicable and communicable.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 70). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

On the other hand, when theology speaks of God as “essence,” it did not obtain this concept by abstraction but by the opposite process of addition, that is, by attributing to God in an absolute sense all the perfections that occur in creatures and therefore by thinking of him as absolute reality, the sum total of all being, the “purest and simplest actuality.” Accordingly, the being that is ascribed to God in theology is at the same time the richest, most perfect, most intensive, most determinate and concrete, absolute and simple Being.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 95). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

We humans can rely on him; he does not change in his being, knowing, or willing. He eternally remains who he is. Every change is foreign to God. In him there is no change in time, for he is eternal; nor in location, for he is omnipresent; nor in essence, for he is pure being. Christian theology frequently also expressed this last point in the term “pure actuality” (purus actua). Aristotle thus conceived God’s being as the “primary form” (reality) without any change (δυναμις), as absolute actuality (ἐνεργεια). Scholasticism, accordingly, began to speak of God as “utterly pure and simple actuality” to indicate that he is perfect and absolute being without any capability (potentia) for nonbeing or for being different. Boethius states, for example, that God does not change in essence “because he is actuality.” For that reason, too, the expression “causa sui” (his own cause) was avoided with reference to God.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (pp. 130-131). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Dolezal, James
IN ADDITION TO MAINTAINING the real identity between God’s essence and existence, the traditional DDS also holds that all of God’s attributes are really identical in him. If God were a complex of really distinct attributes or properties then those various attributes would be more basic than the Godhead itself in explaining or accounting for what God is. To be considered most absolute with respect to all the various perfections predicated of him it is necessary that one regard those perfections as identical with God himself. Identity is the watchword of the strong account of divine simplicity and is crucial to the orthodox articulation of divine absoluteness. Often this identity is expressed in the claim that all that is in God is God.
Dolezal, James E.. God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (p. 125). Pickwick Publications, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

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Self Sufficiency

Bavinck, Herman
He does not have to become anything, but is what he is eternally. He has no goal outside himself but is self-sufficient, all-sufficient (Ps. 50: 8ff.; Isa. 40: 28ff.; Hab. 2: 20). He receives nothing, but only gives. All things need him; he needs nothing or nobody. He always aims at himself because he cannot rest in anything other than himself. Inasmuch as he himself is the absolutely good and perfect one, he may not love anything else except with a view to himself. He may not and cannot be content with less than absolute perfection. When he loves others, he loves himself in them: his own virtues, works, and gifts. For the same reason he is also blessed in himself as the sum of all goodness, of all perfection.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 185). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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Simplicity

Berkhof, Louis
When we speak of the simplicity of God, we use the term to describe the state or quality of being simple, the condition of being free from division into parts, and therefore from compositeness. It means that God is not composite and is not susceptible of division in any sense of the word.
Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology (p. 50). . Kindle Edition.

Bavinck, Herman
It is this conviction that lies behind the teaching of Christian theology that God is “simple,” that is, free from composition. God is identical with each of his attributes; he is what he possesses. In God “to be” is the same as to be wise, to be good, or to be powerful. All God’s attributes are identical with his essence. In all his attributes he is pure being, absolute reality. We cannot refrain from speaking of God’s being, and in the description of God’s essence Christian theology places his aseity in the foreground as the primary attribute traditionally associated with the name YHWH. God is the One who exists of and through himself, the perfect being who is absolute in wisdom and goodness, righteousness and holiness, power and blessedness.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2: God and Creation (p. 70). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

But in God all his attributes are identical with his being. God is light through and through; he is all mind, all wisdom, all logos, all spirit, and so forth. In God “to be is the same as to be wise, which is the same as to be good, which is the same as to be powerful. One and the same thing is stated whether it be said that God is eternal or immortal or good or just.” Whatever God is, he is that completely and simultaneously. “God has no properties but is pure essence. God’s properties are really the same as his essence: they neither differ from his essence nor do they differ materially from each other.”
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (p. 92). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. dentical with God’s being: he is what he possesses.

Calvin, John
2. In this one essence are three persons, yet so that neither is there a triple God, nor is the simple essence of God divided. Meaning of the word Person in this discussion. Three hypostases in God, or the essence of God.
Calvin, John. The John Calvin Collection: 12 Classic Works (Kindle Locations 1580-1581). . Kindle Edition.

Again, whatever is proper to each I affirm to be incommunicable, because nothing can apply or be transferred to the Son which is attributed to the Father as a mark of distinction. I have no objections to adopt the definition of Tertullian, provided it is properly understood, “that there is in God a certain arrangement or economy, which makes no change on the unity of essence.”—
Calvin, John. The John Calvin Collection: 12 Classic Works (Kindle Locations 1739-1742). . Kindle Edition.

This he could not do in part merely, for it were impious to think of a divided God. And besides, on this supposition, there would be a rending of the Divine essence. The whole entire essence must therefore be common to the Father and the Son; and if so, in respect of essence there is no distinction between them. If they reply that the Father, while essentiating, still remains the only God, being the possessor of the essence, then Christ will be a figurative God, one in name or semblance only, and not in reality, because no property can be more peculiar to God than essence, according to the words, “I AM has sent me unto you,” (Ex. 3: 4.)
Calvin, John. The John Calvin Collection: 12 Classic Works (Kindle Locations 2116-2120). . Kindle Edition.

Frame, John
To say that God is simple, in scholastic philosophy, is to say that there is no compositism in his being. Specifically, there is no composition of physical parts, form and matter, actual and potential, genus and differentia, substance and accident, God and his essence, essence and attributes, attributes and one another, or essence and esse. God is not, then, in any sense made up of parts.

Granted that God is not it physical being, it is obvious that he is not made up of physical parts. Nor can he he divided into form and matter, or actuality and potentiality, since he has no matter or (passive) potentiality. Nor is he made up of genus and differentia, since he is not in a genus, nor is he a genus (godhood) differentiated by species (various gods). Nor is he made up of substance and accidents, because there are no accidents in him.-” Since God has no accidents, everything in him is essential to his being. So he is, in a sense, his essence.

But the other claims require further consideration. It is not, indeed, entirely apparent what is meant by parts or divisions in a nonphysical being. In what way could a spiritual being conceivably be divided or composed? What would he the difference, specifically, between a spiritual being whose attributes are parts of him and it spiritual being whose attributes are not parts, but somehow equivalent to himself.’

For Aquinas, parts are always something less than the whole, and parts can he understood and can function to some extent apart from the whole. They are in some measure independent of the whole. If they are united into it whole, they can also, because of their independence, he removed from the whole. And if they are united to a whole, this union is a process by which a potential union is caused to he actual.

There cannot he such parts in God, for several reasons. First, there can he nothing in him that is less, or less noble, than himself. Second, nothing in him can he removed from him, for nothing in him can not he. Third, the fact that he has many attributes is not something caused, for he is the first cause. Fourth, in God there can he no process of potentiality becoming actuality, because he is pure act, with no passive potentiality. So God’s attributes are not parts or divisions within the Godhead in Aquinas’s fairly technical sense of parts, but each attribute is necessary to God’s being. Each is essential to him, and therefore his essence includes all of them. God cannot be God without his goodness, his wisdom, and his eternity. In other words, he is necessarily good, wise, and eternal. None of his attributes can he removed from him, and no new attribute can he added to him. Therefore, none of his attributes exists without the others. So each attribute has divine attributes; each is qualified by the others. God’s wisdom is an eternal wisdom, and his goodness is a wise and (importantly) just goodness. And his esse is a necessary existence, necessary to his essence. Granted who God is, lie cannot fail to exist.
John Frame, The Doctrine of God

MacArthur, John
God’s simplicity is his indivisibility, his perfect lack of composition. This means that each of and all his perfections are his essence.
MacArthur, John; Mayhue, Richard. Biblical Doctrine (Kindle Locations 4378-4379). Crossway. Kindle Edition.

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Timelessness

Bavinck, Herman
Infinity in the sense of not being determined by time is the eternity of God. Scripture nowhere speaks of a beginning of or an end to God’s existence. Though he is often most vividly pictured as entering into time, he still transcends it. He is the first and the last (Isa. 41: 4; Rev. 1: 8), who existed before the world was (Gen. 1: 1; John 1: 1; 17: 5, 24) and who continues despite all change (Ps. 102: 27– 28). He is God from eternity to eternity (Ps. 90: 2; 93: 2). The number of his years is unsearchable (Job 36: 26). A thousand years in his sight are as brief as yesterday is to our mind (Ps. 90: 4; 2 Pet. 3: 8). He is the everlasting God (Isa. 40: 28; Rom. 16: 26), who inhabits eternity (Isa. 57: 15), lives forever and ever (Deut. 32: 40; Rev. 10: 6; 15: 7), swears by his life (Num. 14: 21, 28), is called “the living and enduring God” (1 Pet. 1: 23), the immortal God (Rom. 1: 23; 1 Tim. 6: 16), who is and who was and who is to come (Exod. 3: 14; Rev. 1: 4, 8). Here too, to be sure, Scripture speaks of God in human fashion, and of eternity in the forms of time. At the same time it clearly indicates that God transcends time and cannot be measured or defined by the standards of time. The Deism of past and present, however, defines eternity as time infinitely extended in both directions. According to it, the difference between time and eternity is merely quantitative, not qualitative; gradual, not essential.
Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics : Volume 2 (pp. 134-135). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

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