A reader submitted writing:
John Calvin stipulates that within his scheme of Theological Determinism there is no such thing as “mere” permission. Therefore in Calvin’s Theological Determinism we have the following truth statements:
1) What Calvin’s god “Rendered-Certain” is what he permits.
2) What Calvin’s god does not “Render-Certain” he does not permit.
With these truth statements established, we can forward a logical argument for the consequences of creaturely sin, when it is the case that Calvin’s god “Renders-Certain” such sin.
Let [X] = creature [C] performing sin [S].
Let [NOT X] = creature [C] refraining from performing sin [S].
Now let us say it is the case that [X] is “Rendered-Certain”. Thus it logically follows that [NOT X] is not “Rendered-Certain”.
And from (1) above, since [X] is “Rendered-Certain” then [X] is permitted. And conversely from (2) above, since [NOT X] is not “Rendered-Certain” then [NOT X] is not permitted.
So to summarize:
[C] Performing [S] is permitted, by virtue of being “Rendered-Certain”.
[C] Refraining from [S] is not permitted, by virtue of not being “Rendered-Certain”.
If in this case Calvin’s god judges the creature for not refraining from sin, then he is judging the creature for
something he did not permit the creature to do. It would be the equivalent of a father locking a child in a room,
and then judging the child for not leaving the room.